Introduction
By the end of the twentieth century, only a few years hence, the population of Southeast Asia will be about 530 million.2 Less than 100 years ago, in 1900, the population of Southeast Asia was probably around 80 million people, with almost one-third of the total in Java alone.3 Although there were a number of very large cities in the region and densely settled rice-growing areas in Java, the Red River Delta, and a few other areas, most of mainland and insular Southeast Asia remained a sparsely settled frontier region in 1900.4 Germany had populations of more than 40 million each in 1900. Italy, trying to get into the last grab for African colonies, had a population only slightly lower at 34 million. The only European colonial power in Southeast Asia with a small demographic base at home was the Netherlands which had a little more than 5 million people in 1900.5 Although political and economic power are not determined by population size alone, the regional comparison in 1900 was that of large European populations expanding their dominance over relatively small Southeast Asian populations (except for the case of the Netherlands and Java).
From a demographic base of less than one-third that of Europe in 1900, Southeast Asia will have a population larger than Europe's in the year 2000. Europe's population has expanded by about 60 per cent over the century while Southeast Asia's population has grown more than sixfold. In the year 2000, the largest European country of Germany will have about 83 million people compared to the largest Southeast Asian country of Indonesia which will have a population of almost 218 million.6 Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines will each be considerably more populous than the major European countries of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Even tiny Laos, with a projected population of 5.6 million in the year 2000, will be larger than the European countries of Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Norway, or Albania.
These comparisons highlight the unprecedented and revolutionary demographic growth in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century. These changes in population size and growth are closely intertwined with the economic, social, and political transformations that have also occurred over the last 100 years.7 In this paper, I present an overview of basic demographic changes in Southeast Asia over the twentieth century with primary attention on population growth and the components of fertility and mortality. The availability of data and published research contributes to an unevenness of coverage across the countries in the region. Some of the conclusions and interpretations reported here may not be representative of the region as a whole. There is enormous diversity in all dimensions of Southeast Asian life, including demography.
In this relatively brief essay, it is not possible to provide a full account of the determinants and consequences of population trends in Southeast Asia. In the introduction, I offer some general observations on the geographical, political, and social context of Southeast Asia, circa 1900, to set the stage for the review of demographic trends. In the conclusion, I provide further speculative thoughts on the links between socioeconomic change and the demographic revolutions in twentieth-century Southeast Asia. My intention is to stimulate attention and to offer tentative interpretations for some rather complex, and much neglected, issues. If future research provides corrections to the interpretations offered here, this essay will have served a useful purpose.
The Geographical Setting
The traditional division between mainland and insular Southeast Asia obscures the tremendous topographical diversity within each division. Coastal plains, river valleys, highlands, and mountainous regions are found in almost every part of mainland and insular Southeast Asia. Tropical forests have been pushed back for human settlement and cultivation over the centuries, with the forest sometimes reclaiming the land as settlements were abandoned. Much of the frontier has been settled with the major wave of population growth during the twentieth century, but there still remain large expanses of forested areas (although the lucrative timber industry has taken a significant toll in recent decades).
Historically, settlement patterns in Southeast Asia were shaped by access to the sea and rivers. Fishing was a ubiquitous means of subsistence, and seaborne exchange and trade were central features of most societies throughout the region. Overland transportation was slow and a very difficult avenue for trade in most areas until well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when roads and railroads were constructed on a substantial scale.
The primary agricultural crop of Southeast Asia is rice, which is grown in dry fields and in rain-fed or irrigated fields. Since wet rice (grown in irrigated fields) is a more productive crop than dry rice, there has been an evolutionary drift toward wet rice cultivation accompanying population growth, although the historical process has been reversed many times. It has only been over the last century that the frontier has been pushed back, and much of the region has been brought under wet rice cultivation.8 The scale of human effort necessary to transform tropical forests or swampland into irrigated agricultural fields is possible only with a high population density and a centralized polity to coordinate the construction of irrigation systems.9 The classical civilizations of Angkor, Majapahit, and the Red River Delta based on large expanses of irrigated rice cultivation were not determined by favourable geographical settings alone.
For most of history, small societies and local economies, loosely knit into larger political and trading networks, were probably the most typical communities in the Southeast Asian world.10 Larger political units, based on irrigated agricultural fields and coastal trading cities, were exceedingly vulnerable to military conquest and destruction. The almost limitless frontier of interior rivers and rugged terrain created innumerable ecological niches for small populations with local subsistence economies.
The Political Environment Circa 1900 In the years surrounding 1900, two Southeast Asian worlds were moving past each other. Moving to the backstage was the traditional world of Southeast Asian peasants and aristocratic elites. Moving forward, ascendant in all spheres of social, economic, and political life, was European imperialism and the Southeast Asian world created to serve it. Although Southeast Asian political and commercial development had been cien Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia (Chicago: Aldine, 1972 Studies, 1982) . stunted by European naval dominance for more than two centuries," the Southeast Asian countryside and the bulk of the population had been relatively unaffected by the direct hand of European colonialism. In the last few decades of the nineteenth century and for the first half of the twentieth century, European imperialism reached beyond port cities to all corners of the region.
The new colonial world of large-scale plantations, mines, and administrative cities was constructed in every place that might conceivably yield a profit. If local powers could not be persuaded or bribed into acquiescence, military might was used to compel compliance. New political and social arrangements were institutionalized to insure the profitable workings of the extractive economies of the colonial system.12 In general, the colonial economy was based upon monopolistic practices and the exploitation of cheap (and expendable) labour. Authoritarian colonial governments were legitimated by a belief in the racial superiority of the European governing class.13
Cities, Rural Economies, and Population Settlements With the growth of the colonial economies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban centres, including traditional Southeast Asian entrepots and new colonial cities, began a period of growth after a long period of relative stagnation. In 1910, there were eleven Southeast Asian cities of more than 100,000 population: Mandalay, Rangoon, Bangkok, Hanoi, Saigon-Cholon, Georgetown, Singapore, Batavia, Surakarta, Surabaja, and Manila.14 By and large, these cities were administrative and commercial centres with only a minimal industrial base. McGee notes that colonial cities functioned as economic intermediaries between the metropolitan powers and the colonial economy: they were cities "of clerks, retailers, administrators, hawkers, retailer merchants, and transport workers".15 There was a lower level of urban centres district headquarters, mining towns, and rail junction hubs that connected the major cities with the base of the extractive economy in the rural areas. In contrast to the generative role of cities during the modernization of the West, colonial cites were thought to have only a parasitical role in economic development. The colonial economy did little to stimulate economic development beyond the export sector. Profits from mines and plantations were returned to shareholders in the metropolitan countries, or were used to expand the incomes of local managers and administrators, whose lifestyles were geared to extravagant consumption of importedgoods. Economic investments were limited to the improvement of infrastructure "Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450 Commerce, -1680 (railroads, harbours, roads) to support the development of the extractive economy. Indigenous industrial development was a very low priority.
The rural sector can be divided into three categories, although these are not mutually exclusive. The largest component was the traditional Southeast Asian peasantry who remained oriented to a subsistence economy. The relations between elites/royalty and peasants varied considerably across the region. Both payments "in kind" and corvee labour were traditional obligations of peasants to local elites. Yet the actual level of "exploitation" was probably less than what an idealized account of traditional society might suggest. Francesca Bray concludes that in long-settled areas with a well-developed technology of rice production, most peasants were independent smallholders and not serfs in a feudal system.16
The second component of the rural sector consisted of the commercialized peasantry who participated in the growing market economy stimulated by the expanding colonial system. This sector was not entirely new many Southeast Asian agriculturalists had a long history of growing pepper and other spices for the world market while other areas had produced rice to support the urban populations in the region. This sector expanded dramatically in the late nineteenth century with the demand for rice and other foodstuffs to feed the growing numbers of wage labourers in the enclave economies and colonial cities. The settlement and development of lower Burma, the Central Thai Plain, and the Mekong Delta were direct responses to the expanding world and regional market for rice.17
Finally, the "new" developments of the nineteenth century were the enclave economies of plantations and mines. Rural, often quite remote areas, were "opened up" with Western and Chinese capital and imported wage labour to provide raw materials for the industrial development of Europe. Again, these activities were not completely new.
Tin and gold had been mined for hundreds of years with local labour, and the products were shipped to China and other distant markets. But the scale of development, the massive importation of labour, and the potential profits to be made were far greater than ever before.
All of these groups influenced and were influenced by the dramatic demographic changes of the twentieth century.
Population Growth: 1900 Growth: -2000 The basic facts of population size and growth of early modern Southeast Asia are the subjects of considerable uncertainty and debate. Figure   1 , each census or population count is marked with a symbol, and the points are connected with interpolated values.
The list of countries in Burma, central Siam, and the Mekong Delta. As will be addressed later, these demographic and agricultural changes were in response to massive political and economic forces, including the expansion of regional and long-distance markets, the development of export economies dependent on migrant labour, and improved transportation facilities.
Burma
The first twentieth-century census (1901) (about 42% in 1990) . Already considered to be overpopulated with almost 30 million in 1900, Java has a population that more than tripled over the century. The outer islands of Indonesia contained some pockets of high-density settlements, but in general, most areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands were sparsely settled in 1900.
There has consistently been a higher rate of population growth in the outer islands than in Java over the twentieth century. From 1900 to 1990, the population of the outer islands had increased more than sixfold (11 to 72 million). There have been several distinct periods of population growth in Indonesia. For the first two decadeŝ George S. Siampos, "The Population of Cambodia, 1945 -1980 Fund Quarterly of the century, growth was only about one per cent per year; growth was slowed by cholera and influenza epidemics and by a series of poor harvests.32 During the 1920s, growth expanded to more than two per cent per year with a widening gap between Java and the outer islands. The growth rate of the outer islands was just below three per cent per year.
The thirty-one year span between the 1930 and the 1961 Indonesian censuses encompassed the erosion of the export sector during the Great Depression, the collapse of the entire economy during the Japanese occupation of World War II, and the turbulent years of the war for independence. In comparison, the 1950s were an era of recovery and modest economic improvement. For the entire period , the Indonesian population grew at an average annual rate of 1.5 per cent with the expected gap prevailing between the outer islands and Java. The subsequent two decades saw an accelerating rate of population growth, reaching two per cent per year in Java and almost three per cent per year in the outer islands. The most recent intercensal interval (1980 to 1990) saw a slight decline in the growth rate due to a reduction in fertility. Indonesia is one of the largest countries in the world and is projected to have a population of 218 million by the end of the decade.
Malaysia and Singapore
Peninsular Malaysia (Malaya) has been historically linked with Singapore, especially during the colonial era when Singapore became the major entrepot for the export economy of tin and rubber. Historically, the peninsula was sparsely settled; the only densely settled areas were the wet rice agricultural zones of the northwest (Kedah) and northeast (Kelantan) regions. Dodge estimates that the mid-nineteenth-century population was about 0.75 million which grew to 2.4 million (plus 0.3 million in Singapore) in 1911." Much of this growth was due to the migration from China, India, and the Indonesian archipelago that supplied labour to work in the mines, plantations and smallholdings of the export economy. Over the twentieth century, the rate of population growth fluctuated rising in the 1920s, falling in the 1930s and 1940s, and then rising again in the post-World War II era. Historically, Singapore grew faster than the peninsula, with substantial gains from net migration to the major metropolis. For recent intervals, however, the annual growth rate of Singapore has been half that of Peninsular Malaysia. This reversal is due to the rapidly falling rate of natural increase in Singapore.
International migration has always been an important component of demographic change in Malaysia. The relatively small initial population of the country meant that immigrants and their descendants soon became a substantial minority of the total population (a majority if Singapore is included). After World War II, the open immigration of labour was curtailed, and natural increase became the major source of population growth. The rapid growth of Sabah and Indonesian Kalimantan. There has also been a significant flow of undocumented (illegal) migration from Indonesia to Peninsular Malaysia in the last decade.
Philippines and Thailand
Although they differ in many respects, the Philippines and Thailand share certain demographic features, including roughly similar population size for most of the century. The first Philippine census in 1903 counted a population of 7.6 million, and the 1911 Thai census showed a population of 8.3 million. Over the twentieth century, the rates of population growth in the Philippines and Thailand exceeded those of any other Southeast Asian country with reliable data (with the exception of Singapore).
In 1980, the population of the Philippines was only three million larger than that of Thailand (the census counts were 48 and 45 million, respectively). With a widening of national growth rates in the last two decades of the century, the Philippines is projected to have a population of 76 million in the year 2000 compared to 61 million in Thailand.
The population growth rate of the Philippines has averaged more than two per cent per year for every period reported here except for the interval surrounding World War II. For most of the postwar era, the average rate has been at or just below three per cent. The pace of growth for Thailand has also been very high, but with more fluctuations. The growth rate in Thailand for the initial post World War II era (1947-60) of 3.2 per cent per annum is the highest figure in Table ( Interpreting Twentieth-Century Population Growth
The most basic observation revealed by these figures is how quickly small populations can become demographic giants within a few generations. The stark reversal of the relative demographic balance between Europe and Southeast Asia reflects the power of "compound interest" growth. Over just a few generations, the impact of growth rates of one or two per cent per annum can be spectacular. Although Europe and Southeast Asia have (or soon will) experienced demographic transitions from high to low birth and death rates, their growth rates differed dramatically during the process.
In the course of the European demographic transitions, population growth rates rarely exceeded one per cent per annum while growth rates in Southeast Asia were often in the two to three per cent range.
Demographers who study population trends usually begin their search for explanations with the decomposition of growth rates into components reflecting fertility, mortality, and migration. For most of Southeast Asia, adequate national data on fertility and mortality only became available at mid-century and sometimes even later. Nonetheless, some general observations can be drawn from the very fragmentary data presented in Table 1 . Our interpretation begins with a general outline of twentiethcentury Southeast Asian history. While such an exercise is fraught with oversimplification, given the diversity of the region, it provides a useful template with which to read population dynamics.
The first three decades of the twentieth century continued the process of "opening up" the region to export industries (mining, plantations, smallholdings) and growing political and economic integration of the colonies with the imperial powers of Great It is difficult to discern clear trends for the first half of the twentieth century. The data are sparse and subject to serious problems of unreliable measurement. There are wide variations in growth rates from less than one per cent to above two per cent per annum. Some of the low values may well be due to depressed living conditions (e.g., in parts of Vietnam). The impact of the influenza epidemic of 1917-18 may be partially responsible for some of the low growth rates in Indonesia and elsewhere.37 In several countries, the relative prosperity of the 1920s were reflected in higher rates of population growth. International migration from China and India was a major factor in the rapid growth of the population of Peninsular Malaysia during the first three decades of the century.
Colin Brown, "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 in Indonesia", The postwar era stands out as a unique period of extraordinarily rapid population growth. Over the second half of the century, every national population more than doubled in size and some have tripled. There are relatively few signs of regional variations in growth rates that might be directly associated with national differences in economic trends. Rapid population growth was primarily a result of record declines in mortality which were pervasive across the region. Population growth slackened in several countries during the 1970s and 1980s, as fertility declines took hold. Continued declines in mortality and the youthful age structure of Southeast Asian populations are slowing the impact of declining fertility rates on population growth rates. Sometime in the middle of the twenty-first century, population growth in the region will probably cease, but not before most Southeast Asian populations will have doubled from their present size.
Perhaps the most general pattern revealed in One of the most debated issues among demographers and historians is the reported high rates of population growth in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. Initially, there was considerable uncertainty whether the high population growth rates during the colonial era could really be believed. Since colonial regimes did not attempt to alleviate poverty and did not put a high priority on heath services, there was little basis to assume that mortality rates had been reduced. There was also an alternative explanation for the high rates of growth in colonial Southeast Asia, namely poor data. If the earlier estimates of population were too low, and the accuracy of population estimation and census enumerations improved over time, increasing rates of population growth could be explained as an artifact of improved measurement. However, even after taking these measurement problems into account, recent scholarship by Owen and Reid seems to have firmly established that population growth rates in the nineteenth century were above two per cent per annum in many areas of Southeast Asia.38
This level of growth which exceeded that of Europe for the same period represented Reid, "Low Population Growth"; Owen, "The Paradox of Nineteenth-Century Population Growth" a clear break from the very low levels of population growth in Southeast Asia in earlier centuries.39
There are several possible reasons why mortality may have been lower and fertility higher in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia relative to historic levels. Perhaps the most important impact of colonial rule was a sharp reduction in warfare among competing indigenous elites. Although traditional Southeast Asian wars may not have directly caused great numbers of casualties, warfare undoubtedly caused disruptions in agricultural production and regional trade in foodstuffs that led to demographic crises.40 Frequent episodes of warfare certainly contributed to higher levels of mortality (or frequent periods of crisis mortality) in the precolonial era.
Another plausible explanation is that fertility may have risen with the spread of Islam and Christianity throughout insular Southeast Asia. The spread of institutional religions was probably associated with permanent settlements that increased the value of child labour. Formal religions may also have discouraged premarital sexual activity and thereby reduced the incidence of gonorrhea and other sexually transmitted diseases that contributed to high levels of sterility in the region.41
The Frontier and Population Growth Another important factor in the second half of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth centuries may have been the settlement of frontier regions. This interpretation would be consistent with the observed intercountry differences in growth rates and follows from prior interpretations of regional differences in Indonesian population growth.42 Many of the frontier areas were populated by rice cultivators, as were most of the long-settled areas in Southeast Asia, but there were significant ecological and demographic differences.
Except for the core areas of wet rice cultivation, shifting cultivation was the predominant mode of agriculture in most parts of Southeast Asia until the nineteenth century. The very high level of productivity of irrigated (wet) rice cultivation led to a transformation of the social and economic fabric of community life in many parts of Southest Asia. According to Clifford Geertz, wet rice cultivation has the unique capacity to absorb more labour and a growing population.43 Although there are limits to the demographic absorptive capacity of rice growing communities, it is far greater than most other crops. In spite the of the ubiquitous demand for more food, the ' '"Fisher (p. 69) transition from shifting cultivation to irrigated cultivation was not an automatic development or even the most likely social response to population pressure. The endless frontier in most regions offered an easier option migration.
The construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities represented an enormous investment by a large number of farmers over many years. The scale of labour necessary for such an investment was far greater than would be available from a group of households or an extended kinship alliance.44 In most cases, the construction of irrigation facilities was coordinated (compelled) by a centralized political authority which had effective power to mobilize and control labour from many villages in an area. The power of strong states that led to improved agricultural productivity did not necessarily raise the living standards of the peasantry. Political power could also be used to abuse the peasant population by greater taxation and labour conscription. The need for large scale labour to maintain irrigation systems also limited the scope of geographic mobility of peasants and may have discouraged innovation.
The delicate balance in civil engineering needed to direct water flows over large expanses of landscape meant that irrigated agricultural systems were highly vulnerable to disruption. War, natural calamities, and or the decline of peasant populations for whatever reason (disease, flight) could have easily resulted in the decay of irrigated rice fields and the collapse of centralized political systems that were dependent on large numbers of peasant cultivators. Irrigated rice cultivation probably waxed and waned with the rise and fall of strong political institutions. In a provocative hypothesis, Zeiinsky suggests that the low population density of much of Southeast Asia was due the region's political instability relative to East or South Asia.45
The spread of wet rice agriculture to frontier areas in Southeast Asia during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, however, seems to have been a decisive break in Southeast Asian history and the primary reason for the accelerated rapid demographic growth in modern times. This hypothesis is sketched in a preliminary fashion here; a complete account would require much more historical investigation than is possible within the confines of the present paper.
The growing demand for rice and an increasingly sophisticated commercial and transportation system gave tremendous impetus to Southeast Asian agricultural development in the late nineteenth century. Although there is considerable debate over the incorporation of Southeast Asia into the worldwide rice market in the late nineteenth century, there is no doubt that expanded production of rice transformed the Southeast Asian socioeconomic and physical landscape.46 There had always been regional and long distance trade in rice and other commodities in Southeast Asia. Indeed the commercial revolution of the sixteenth century was largely based on the trade of agricultural products produced for a world market.47
Bray, The Rice Economies, Ch. 2. Zeiinsky, "The Indochinese Peninsula: A Demographic Anomaly".
"Owen, "The Rice Industry of Southeast Asia"; Cheng Siok-Hwa, The Rice Industry of Burma, 1852 Burma, -1940 What was different about the late nineteenth century was the seemingly unlimited demand for rice a product that was labour intensive and produced by peasant households. The enormous demand for rice stimulated production for the market among the traditional community of subsistence farmers, and more importantly led to a massive wave of migration and the settlement of frontier areas. Much of the demand for rice was from within Southeast Asia: the expanding export sector of mines and plantations brought hundreds of thousands of labourers into the region who needed to be fed, and rice was what they wanted. The growth of colonial cities also increased the demand for foodstuffs, particularly rice. But there was also enormous demand from markets worldwide, especially Europe.48
The primary major rice exporting areas were developed in lower Burma, central Siam, and Cochinchina.49 In the Burma Delta, the area under rice cultivation expanded tenfold from the 1850s to the 1930s.50 While the expansion of rice cultivation was most dramatic in these areas, there was a continued settlement of frontier areas throughout Southeast Asia during this period.
Rice production, especially in newly settled frontier areas, was accompanied by faster population growth. Permanent settlements, rather than shifting cultivation, were conducive to more frequent childbearing. Frontiers were also places of available land and new opportunities. The abundant opportunities in frontier areas probably led to a relaxation of constraints on younger age at marriage, which would also have contributed to a higher rate of population growth. And a more stable food supply probably provided sufficient nutrition to keep mortality within normal bounds. The expansion into frontier areas and the creation of additional zones of wet rice cultivation were the conditions that fostered for the demographic expansion during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These frontier areas fed not only the growing working classes of the cities and the labour force producing commodities for export, but also allowed for a significant demographic expansion of the peasant populations with the expansion of wet rice cultivation.
Over the decades of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the rice growing frontiers with (relatively) low population densities became regions with increasingly dense population. If the above interpretation is generally correct, then the incentives to faster population growth with very young marriage and high levels of fertility should have gradually decreased over the century as agricultural population density increased. This hypothesis remains to be tested.
Trends and Patterns of Mortality Decline
The greatest human achievement of the twentieth century is the control of mortality. Life expectancy is over 60 years in every Southeast Asian country with the exceptions of Laos, Cambodia, and Burma/Myanmar. The statistics, however, do not convey the human drama of the accomplishment. In much of Southeast Asia, it is now common for both husbands and wives to survive until the end of their reproductive period. Southeast Asia although historical data on mortality levels in the region are too poor to document this point.52 The gap in longevity between developed and developing countries probably widened during the first half of the century (with improvements in health and reductions in mortality occurring sooner in the West than in Asia). However, there is no doubt that international differences in mortality have narrowed dramatically in the second half of the century.
For the decades prior to 1950, there are very few sources for the systematic study of mortality levels and trends in Southeast Asia. Registration of births and deaths, the backbone of mortality measurement in developed countries, remains incomplete in most Southeast Asian countries with the exceptions of Singapore and Malaysia, although innovative methods of indirect demographic estimation based on survey and census data have yielded a substantial body of estimates of Southeast Asian mortality for recent decades. These estimates are imprecise for detecting small differences, particularly at low levels of mortality. For this reason, some of the estimates of regional variations and trends in mortality appear to be inconsistent. In spite of these measurement problems, our knowledge of recent trends in Southeast Asian mortality is much better than it was for earlier times.
In another important development, historians and demographers are beginning to sift through parish records and other archival sources to study historical patterns of Southeast Asian mortality.53 Although this literature is just beginning to emerge, there is considerable promise that fine grained historical studies of health and mortality will provide an important new vista for studies of Southeast Asian social history.
There are few clear generalizations about levels and trends in morbidity and mortality for the early decades of the twentieth century. Population growth seems to rising frequency of episodes of crisis mortality in the late nineteenth century in the Philippines and concluded that the diffusion of disease from increased trade and a general deterioration of peasant livelihoods (due to the commercialization of peasant agriculture) were the primary reasons for the outbreaks of higher mortality. 56 Nonetheless, suggest that a reasonable case can be made that mortality levels stabilized at moderately high levels in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A crude birth rate of 40-45 (moderately high) combined with a crude death rate of 20-25 would still yield a very rapid annual growth rate of about two per cent per year. This interpretation does not require an assumption of declining mortality, only that periods of exceptionally high mortality ("crisis mortality") were relatively rare. Frequent periods of crisis mortality would have reduced the overall population growth rate below the one to two per cent level. The validity of this thesis depends on the argument that the colonial era fostered conditions that stabilized mortality levels.
As noted earlier, the major premise of this argument is that colonial rule reduced the level of local warfare among Southeast Asian powers.57 There are good reasons to expect that the frequent warfare that prevailed in premodern Southeast Asia was not especially deadly. The objective of traditional Southeast Asian warfare was to capture manpower, not land, so the mass killing of enemy forces would have been counterproductive. Moreover, a strategy of massive battle casualties would also have dissipated the forces the primary source of wealth of the victor. Frequent warfare during the precolonial era, however, did seriously disrupt food production systems, especially irrigated rice cultivation.58 Traditional patterns of warfare may also have discouraged the expansion of agriculture.59 The colonial advance did, of course, lead to resistance by indigenous states, but most often the battles and skirmishes were of a relatively short duration and with modest losses.60
The second premise of the argument is that the colonial era saw an expansion of transportation networks and a more secure supply of food for cities. As noted earlier, the demand created by the growing proletarian workforce on plantations and mines and in the cities stimulated an enormous expansion of production of rice and other foodstuffs for the market. The increase in commercial production meant there was a greater potential for market forces to respond to changes in demand caused by poor harvests in local areas thus easing potential cases of crisis mortality. More efficient markets should also have stimulated production that led to higher levels of consumption and improved levels of nutrition. Again, my interpretation is not that mortality levels were substantially reduced, but that they were stabilized and periods of crisis mortality were dampened. Java", p. 81. around village houses and generally unhealthy conditions.61 Common afflictions included pneumonia, dysentery, malaria, hookworm, yaws, and venereal disease, but the major killers were smallpox and cholera. Both diseases swept through areas on a periodic basis causing substantial mortality.62 Also, the influenza epidemic of 1918 had a major impact on mortality in Indonesia.63 A medical system of hospitals, doctors, and nurses gradually developed in most Southeast Asian countries over the first four decades of the twentieth century. By and large, this was an urban medical system that served a very limited fraction of the population. But there were some public health initiatives that did reach out to rural populations and reduced the spread of endemic diseases.64
In every country of Southeast Asia, the years of World War II were ones of extreme economic hardship. Following the difficult years of the Great Depression when the export sector declined, the 1940s saw the complete collapse of the mining and plantation sectors. Labourers from the export enclaves and cities migrated to rural areas to become subsistence farmers. Cash crops, which employed a major fraction of the workforce in many countries, could not be sold to international markets and local incomes plummeted. Imported goods, including medicines, were unavailable. All accounts suggest that mortality rose to record levels during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia from 1942 to 1945.65 The general pattern for postwar Southeast Asia is one of dramatic declines in mortality, although the national revolutions in Indonesia and Vietnam postponed the process in these countries. Not only was there a recovery of the "normal" economy and improvement of living standards, but public health campaigns and the curative powers of modern medicine were disseminated to every part of the globe. Until the 1930s when sulfa drugs were introduced, the ability of medicine to cure disease was limited to first aid and nursing care. On the heels of sulfa drugs came penicillin and other antibiotics in the late 1940s and 1950s. For the first time in history, a relatively simple procedure an injection could make ill people well. The other postwar development was the spread of massive public health campaigns.
DDT spraying in the late 1940s and 1950s helped reduce the incidence of malaria. There were also large-scale programmes to inoculate school children against most of the major childhood endemic diseases. These new innovations were often sponsored by international agencies, but soon became part of national health programmes throughout Southeast Asia.
Some indications of the impact of these programmes on national levels of mortality are shown in 51.1 this hypothesis. In a few cases, the figures for the 1980s and the 1990s (which are based on United Nations estimates) are higher than for the same country in the middle to late 1970s (in particular, note the differences for Burma/Myanmar). This does not necessarily mean that there has been an actual rise in mortality. More likely, the methods of data adjustment and estimation have led to different values. This is another reminder of the imprecision of the figures. Malaysia and Singapore have mortality conditions that are comparable to most developed countries, and Thailand is almost at the same level. Only slightly lower on the ladder are the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam with life expectancies in the low to mid-sixties. The relative path of mortality decline of these countries reflects their social and economic history. In the 1950s, Indonesia had one of the shortest lifespans in the region, while the Philippines was in the upper ranks. Only 40 years later, Indonesia has shot up to become one of the more successful countries in the region with moderate levels of mortality. Although the Philippines has made significant absolute progress, her relative gains have been much less that other countries. Burma/Myanmar, and especially Laos and Cambodia, lag far behind, with life expectancies in the 50s in the 1990s.
There The results show that war deaths (military and civilian casualties) raised mortality rates of all demographic groups from 1965 to 1975, but the greatest impact was on the mortality of young men (age 15-29) who were more than six times as likely to die from war than from natural causes.
Data on sex differentials in life expectancy (data reported in the UN volume, but not shown here), show that females have lower mortality rates than men at all ages in every country in the region. While some fraction of the female advantage in longevity is certainly biological, a considerable fraction of the difference in every society reflects gender differences in behaviour and environmental influences. The single most important behavioural factor for male-female differences in mortality in most societies is smoking.
Trends and Patterns of Fertility Decline
There are few direct measures of Southeast Asian fertility before the last few decades. The reality of high mortality for most of history meant that high levels of childbearing were a functional necessity for the biological continuity of any popula- Table 3 shows the trend in two fertility measures from the 1950s to the early 1990s. The most recent estimates for 1985-89 and 1990-94 in Table 3 Movement", Population Bulletin 45,3 (Nov. 1990): 1-46. Richard Leete and Iqbal Alam (eds.) . The Revolution in Asian Fertility: Dimensions, Causes, and Implications (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993) . decades, or even centuries, is lost. Owing to the combination of normal high mortality and episodes of crisis mortality, the long-term demographic growth rate of mankind has oscillated around zero.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the mortality levels of both Europe and Southeast Asia were in the process of change. In both Europe and Southeast Asia, there was a reduction in the frequency of crisis mortality episodes (the 1944-45 famine in Vietnam was the single major exception). In Europe, economic growth and modernization began to produce to lower levels of "normal" mortality as well through improved levels of nutrition, urban sanitation, and some aspects of better health care.
Even without a reduction in "normal" mortality in Southeast Asia (and the available evidence suggests little reduction), the decline in the frequency of crisis mortality episodes seems to have sparked an era of fairly rapid population growth beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth. In Southeast Asia, fertility levels remained high for another 50 to 70 years. Why? The answer, noted a generation ago by Irene Taeuber, was "the natural dynamics of colonialism lowered mortality (but) perpetuated high fertility. Colonial policy did not favor the industrialization, urbanization, and advancing education that were associated historically with declining fertility among Western peoples.
In so far as the partial diffusion of the Western economy and society influenced the fertility of the East it tended toward increase rather than decrease."88
The colonial order tended to reinforce traditional society as the ideal for the rural peasantry. It was not just colonial ideology, but colonial policies that stilled socioeconomic change and modernization. Only a small minority of the population in colonial Southeast Asia were able to obtain more than primary level schooling and to participate in the modern urban economy. The net result was that modern incentives for smaller families did not reach the bulk of the population. The opportunities for innovation in the rural sector movement to the frontier or planting cash crops were labour intensive activities that reinforced the family economy. More children meant more family labour and potentially more income. In spite of 50 to 100 years of continued population growth, high fertility was a rational response to the circumstances prevailing until the end of colonialism in the post-World War II era.
The rapidity of the decline of fertility from the 1960s to the 1980s is due to a number of factors, including the population pressure created by reduced infant and child mortality from the 1950s onwards. Even within the context of the rural family economy, there might well have been a slow demographic response of lower fertility as the limits of land and production were strained by families of 4 to 6 surviving children. But the fertility declines were accelerated by the forces of modernization: mass education, growing consumer aspirations, and prospects for modern sector employment also contributed to a weakening of incentives for large families. The costs of children were felt and had to be weighed against alternatives. The availability of family planning programmes were another factor that combined with these structural incentives to bring fertility down more rapidly than almost everyone expected.89
The consequences of population growth on society are more difficult to assess. The Malthusian image of a race between population on the one hand and food, resources, and living space on the other, is a misleading perspective from which to judge the impact of population numbers and growth on the social fabric. More often, the impact of population growth is embedded in the conflicts between resources, obligations, and aspirations. These can be examined at the household and societal levels. Throughout most of Southeast Asian history, the primary population problem has been one of a labour shortage. The high levels of "normal" mortality meant that many households and small settlements were perpetually at risk of losing the minimum supply of labour necessary to maintain their subsistence economy. Traditional local elites always needed more manpower to wage war or produce a greater economic surplus. Colonial administrators expended great effort to import (cheap) labour to work in the export sector industries.
When the opposite circumstances prevailed, i.e., too many mouths to feed or not enough land available for numerous progeny, migration was the typical path of least resistance. As the nineteenth century progressed and communities had the potential to double their size in 35 years to 70 years (based on assumptions of annual growth rates of two per cent and one per cent, respectively), movement to frontier areas became a more common pattern. These developments were not confined to Southeast Asia. Major streams of international migration are one of the dominant worldwide patterns of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Earlier in this paper, suggested that the creation of new zones of wet rice production in lower Burma, central Siam, and Cochin China was a response to the growing demand for rice. The settlement of these areas would not have been possible without the availability of "surplus" labour from already densely settled areas that were strained by continued population growth.
While migration was one response, it was not an option that was available or attractive to many peasants. The relatively elastic productive limits of wet rice agriculture meant that additional labour could be used to more carefully prepare the fields, maintain the irrigation system, weed the fields, and carefully harvest each rice stalk.90 In Knodel, et al., Thailand's Reproductive Revolution. Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution; Anne Booth, "Accommodating a Growing Population in such an environment, infinite subdivision of plots of land and multiple job holding in the off-season are common strategies to maintain a minimal standard of survival. Densely settled communities also seem to have lower fertility than sparsely settled areas or transitional frontier areas. Central and east Java, and the rice bowl of Kedah and Perils, have historically had low fertility. It may not be conscious family planning, but rather patterns of high divorce, long breastfeeding, or sexual abstinence that are the social mechanisms that restrain population growth in such circumstances. More detailed research is needed to explain how these processes evolved and were reinforced by cultural traditions.
The consequences of population growth should be strongest for the post-World War II era. During the last 30 to 40 years, growth rates have regularly exceeded two per cent and sometimes three per cent per year. Yet it is difficult to point to specific outcomes that are unambiguously a response to population pressure at the household or community level. Pressures on the absorptive capacity of schools and labour markets have surely been strained. The increase of the "underemployed" (those without productive economic roles or in marginal employment) is due, at least to some degree, to the increasing numbers of youth reaching adulthood over the last 15 to 25 years.91 Part of the problem of identifying clear-cut consequences is that demographic pressures are intertwined with societal patterns of social and economic change. A slightly higher degree of poverty may be endured with 6 children rather than with 4 children, but most individuals and families find ways to cope and endure in any circumstance.
Perhaps the most visible demographic response over the last two decades has been the rapid declines in fertility throughout the region. In societies where there are no cultural barriers to family planning and contraceptives are widely available (e.g., Thailand), fertility has dropped from high (6-7 children per woman) to low (two children per woman) levels in a single generation. With similar demographic and economic pressures in other societies, I suspect that fertility patterns in the entire region are following a similar path. An important mechanism for lowered fertility has been the postponement of marriage. Higher levels of educational attainment and labour force participation by women have caused a dramatic rise in the average age at marriage in Malaysia and other countries in the region. These changes may well lead to an increase in celibacy in societies where universal marriage was deeply etched in local cultures. Demographic change and social change are deeply intertwined. The impact of wars, crises, and economic transformations often leave their footprints on historical trends and patterns of mortality, fertility, marriage, and other demographic processes. In turn, demographic factors, including rapid population growth or decline, population density, and population structure have collective consequences on social, political, and economic outcomes. The exceedingly dramatic history of Southeast Asia over the twentieth century represents a most propitious arena to study these questions.
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